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Abstract
This paper presents a new model construction for a natural cut-free infinitary version K+ω (μ) of the propositional modal μ-
calculus. Based on that the completeness of K+ω (μ) and the related system Kω(μ) can be established directly – no detour, for
example through automata theory, is needed. As a side result we also obtain a finite, cut-free sound and complete system for the
propositional modal μ-calculus.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The propositional modal μ-calculus, introduced in Kozen [13], is a remarkable and well-established formalism
which extends the usual (multi-)modal propositional logic by operators for least and greatest fixed points of positive
operators. It is notoriously intricate, mainly due to the possibility of forming complicate nestings of least and greatest
fixed points, and plays a central role in many logic-oriented approaches to computer science, in particular in connection
with so-called programming logics and process calculi. The reader may consult Bradfield and Stirling [5] for a first
overview and as a good guide to the literature.
During the previous two decades a lot of substantial research has been carried through in connection with the
propositional modal μ-calculus, mainly focusing on its automata- and model-theoretic properties and its behavior with
respect to model checking. There are also lines of research which consider the μ-calculus as an algebraic system rather
than a logic. The relevant literature is affluent, and we confine ourselves to mentioning only a few typical articles
which provide a good point of departure for further reading: Arnold and Niwin´ski [2], Bradfield [4], Emerson et al.
[7], Grädel [9], Janin and Walukiewicz [12], Lenzi [16], Santocanale [18,19], Stirling and Walker [22], Streett and
Emerson [23], Winskel [26].
Corresponding work on the proof theory of the propositional modal μ-calculus has been slower to be achieved.
Kozen [13], among other results, presents a sound axiomatization and shows it to be complete for a restricted version
of the μ-calculus. Walukiewicz [24] analyzes an interesting sound and complete deductive system for the μ-calculus,
and Walukiewicz [25] deals with the completenes of Kozen’s original axiomatization. However, automata- rather than
proof-theoretic methods are at the core of this approach.
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There are also approaches to the propositional modal μ-calculus via tableaux calculi which provide some interesting
proof-theoretic information and several useful deductive systems. Examples of those can be found, for example, in
Stirling and Walker [22] and Winskel [26]. More recent work on the modal μ-calculus, also with some proof-theoertic
flavor, is in Dam and Gurov [6] and Sprenger and Dam [21]. In these articles Gentzen-style sequent calculi for modal
and first order μ-calculi with approximations are introduced and studied in connection with program verification and
explicit inductions.
Kozen [14] exhibits an important connection between the finite model property of the propositional modalμ-calculus
and the theory of well-quasi-orders. This paper also mentions an infinitary derivation rule, similar to those which we
will introduce later, and proves soundness as well as completeness of a deduction system incorporating this rule.
In the focus of this article are two natural infinitary versions Kω(μ) and K+ω (μ)of the propositional modalμ-calculus.
Both are based on a sort of ω-rule for introducing greatest fixed points and the usual closure rule
A[(μX)A[X]] ⇒ (μX)A[X] ()
for least fixed points. Actually, in order to be precise, a Tait-style reformulation of () will be used in the formulations
of Kω(μ) and K+ω (μ); see Section 4. By means of the small model property Kω(μ) is later collapsed to a finite cut-free
system K<ω(μ). As it turns out, Kω(μ) contains K+ω (μ) and is itself contained in K<ω(μ); in addition, all three systems
prove exactly those sentences which are valid with respect to the standard semantics of the μ-calculus.
Proving the completeness of K+ω (μ) is the technically challenging part of the present study. From Alberucci and
Jäger [1] we adapt the notion of saturated set and use those sets to build a syntactic Kripke structure. Problems
arise in connection with the rule () which is inherently impredicative in the sense that the logical complexity of
A[(μX)A[X]] is greater than that of (μX)A[X]. Hence direct proofs by induction on the lengths of formulas cannot
be carried through. However, by a more careful assignment of ranks (finite sequences of ordinals rather than ordinals),
combined with ideas from Streett and Emerson [23], we achieve our goal.
This paper presents an, as we think, new model construction which is a canonical extension of standard model
constructions in modal logic. Based on that the completeness of natural infinitary versions of the propositional modal
μ-calculus is obtained directly – no detour, for example through automata theory, is needed. As a side result we also
obtain a cut-free and complete finite system for μ. Similar techniques have been exploited before, see Jäger et al.
[10,11], in order to design cut-free, sound and complete deductive system for the logic of common knowledge and the
stratified propositional modal μ-calculus.
We thank the referee of a preliminary version of this article for helpful comments.
2. Monotone operators
The sole purpose of this section is to recapitulate some basic facts concerning least and greatest fixed points of
monotone operators. While doing this, we also fix some notation which will be convenient for our later purposes. For
further reading, proofs of the properties stated below and relevant background information we refer, for example, to
the textbooks Barwise [3] and Moschovakis [17].
Given a set S, we write Pow(S) for the power set of S. The collection of all ordinals is denoted by On, and ω is the
least infinite ordinal, generally identified with the set of all natural numbers.
Definition 1. Let M be an arbitrary set. A monotone operator on M is a mapping  from Pow(M) to Pow(M),
 : Pow(M) → Pow(M), so that for all subsets S0 and S1 of M
S0 ⊂ S1 ⇒ (S0) ⊂ (S1).
If (S) = S for some subset S of M , then S is called a fixed point of the operator .
Starting with the empty set, iterated applications of the monotone operator  give us what we call the lower stages of
. Alternatively, it is also possible to begin with the whole domain, and then successive applications of  generate its
upper stages.
272 G. Jäger et al. / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 76 (2008) 270–292
Definition 2. Let M be an arbitrary set and  an arbitrary monotone operator on M .
1. By transfinite induction on the ordinals we define for each α ∈ On the lower and upper stages of  as follows:
I<α :=
⋃
β<α
(I
<β
 ) and J
<α
 :=
⋂
β<α
(J
<β
 ).
2. Based on these stages we set
I :=
⋃
α∈On
I<α and J :=
⋂
α∈On
J<α .
Well-known classical results state that for any monotone operator  on a set M the sequence of its lower stages
(I<α : α ∈ On) is increasing and approximates its least fixed point I. What is more, to obtain I, not all ordinals
are needed but only an initial segment whose cardinality is bound by the cardinality of M . By duality, we have the
corresponding theorem concerning the greatest fixed point of a monotone operator.
Theorem 3 (Least and greatest fixed points). Let M be an arbitrary set and  an arbitrary monotone operator on M .
Then we have:
1. The lower stages of  are increasing and its upper stages decreasing, i.e. for all ordinals α and β
α ≤ β ⇒ I<α ⊂ I<β and J<β ⊂ J<α .
2. I is the least fixed point of  and J its greatest fixed point; moreover
I =⋂{S ⊂ M : (S) ⊂ S} =⋂{S ⊂ M : S = (S)},
J =⋃{S ⊂ M : S ⊂ (S)} =⋃{S ⊂ M : (S) = S}.
3. There exist ordinals α and β of cardinality less than or equal to the cardinality of M so that I = I<α and
J = J<β .
3. Syntax and semantics of the propositional modal μ-calculus
We will formulate the propositional modal μ-calculus in a language Lμ which comprises the following syntactically
different basic symbols:
1. Arbitrarily many labels a, b, c and countably many atomic propositions P,Q,R (both possibly with subscripts);
2. Countably many free variables U,V,W and countably many bound variables X, Y,Z (both possibly with
subscripts);
3. The propositional constants ⊥ and 
, the propositional connectives ∨ and ∧ plus the connective ∼ for forming
the complements of atomic propositions and free variables;
4. For each label a the modal operators 〈a〉 and [a];
5. The fixed point operators μ and ν.
As auxiliary symbols we allow parentheses, brackets and commas. Substitutions of formulas for free variables will
be very important in the following and throughout the sequel. In order to be able to describe such manipulations in a
convenient way, the following notation is introduced.
By an n-ary nominal form (n ≥ 1) we mean a non-empty finite string of symbols which contains in addition to the
basic symbols of Lμ at most the nominal symbols ∗1, . . . , ∗n. These nominal symbols are supposed to be different
from the basic symbols of Lμ. In an n-ary nominal form, the nominal symbols ∗1, . . . , ∗n may occur arbitrarily often.
We shall always denote nominal forms by the letters A,B, C (possibly with subscripts). If A is an n-ary nominal form
(n ≥ 1) and z1, . . . , zn are non-empty finite strings of symbols, then A[z1, . . . , zn] denotes the string of symbols which
is obtained from A by simultaneously replacing all nominal forms ∗1, . . . , ∗n by z1, . . . , zn.
Definition 4. The formulas A,B,C, . . . (possibly with subscripts) of Lμ are inductively defined as follows:
1. All atomic propositions P and free variables U as well as their complements ∼P and ∼U are formulas of Lμ.
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2. The propositional constants ⊥ and 
 are formulas of Lμ.
3. If A and B are formulas of Lμ, then (A ∨ B) and (A ∧ B) are formulas of Lμ.
4. If a is a label and B a formula of Lμ, then 〈a〉B and [a]B are formulas of Lμ.
5. If A[U ] is a formula of Lμ which does not contain occurrences of ∼U and if the free variable U and the bound
variable X do not occur in A, then (μX)A[X] and (νX)A[X] are formulas of Lμ.
An Lμ formula A is positive in U if it does not contain any occurrences of ∼U . Hence Lμ formulas (μX)A[X] and
(νX)A[X] can only be built if A[U ] is positive in U .
The formulas ∼P and ∼U act as negations of P and U , respectively. For introducing the negations of general
formulas we make use of the law of double negation, de Morgan’s laws and specific dualities between the modal
operators 〈a〉/[a] and least/greatest fixed points.
Definition 5. The negation ¬A of an Lμ formula A is inductively defined as follows:
1. If A is the atomic proposition P , then ¬A is ∼P ; if A is the formula ∼P , the ¬A is P .
2. If A is the free variable U , then ¬A is ∼U ; if A is the formula ∼U , the ¬A is U .
3. If A is the propositional constant ⊥, then ¬A is 
; if A is the propositional constant 
, then ¬A is ⊥.
4. If A is the formula (B ∨ C) then ¬A is (¬B ∧ ¬C); if A is the formula (B ∧ C) then ¬A is (¬B ∨ ¬C).
5. If A is the formula 〈a〉B then ¬A is [a]¬B; if A is the formula [a]B then ¬A is 〈a〉¬B.
6. If A is the formula (μX)A[X], then ¬A is (νX)A˜[X]; if A is the formula (νX)A[X], then ¬A is (μX)A˜[X].
Here A˜ is the (uniquely determined) unary nominal form so that ¬A[∼U ] is A˜[U ] for all free variables U .
Observe that the definitions of ¬(μX)A[X] and ¬(νX)A[X] make sense since the U -positivity of A[U ] implies the
U -positivity of A˜[U ]. We abbreviate the remaining connectives as usual,
(A → B) := (¬A ∨ B),
(A ↔ B) := ((A → B) ∧ (B → A)),
and omit parentheses if there is no danger of confusion. Given a formula A, we write fv(A) for the collection of all
free variables occurring in A. A formula A is called closed or a sentence if fv(A) is empty.
Definition 6. A Kripke structure for Lμ is a triple M = (M,H0, H1) satisfying the following three conditions:
(KS.1) M is a set, the so-called universe of M; the elements of M are the worlds of M.
(KS.2) H0 is a mapping which assigns to any label a a binary relation H0(a) on M , i.e. H0(a) ⊂ M × M .
(KS.3) H1 is a mapping which assigns to any atomic proposition P a subset H1(P ) of M .
If M is the Kripke structure (M,H0, H1), then we normally write |M| for the universe M of M as well as M(a) and
M(P ) for the interpretations H0(a) and H1(P ) of the names a and atomic propositions P , respectively.
A valuation v in a Kripke structure M assigns to each free variable U a subset v(U) of |M|. Now let v be any
valuation in M, U a free variable and S a subset of |M|. Then we write v[U :S] for the valuation which maps U on S
and otherwise agrees with v.
Definition 7. Consider a Kripke structure M. Then, for any valuation v in M, the truth set ‖A‖(M,v) of an Lμ formula
A is inductively defined as follows:
1. For atomic propositions, free variables and propositional constants:
‖P ‖(M,v) := M(P ), ‖∼P ‖(M,v) := |M| \ M(P ),
‖U‖(M,v) := v(U), ‖∼U‖(M,v) := |M| \ v(U),
‖
‖(M,v) := |M|, ‖⊥‖(M,v) := ∅.
2. For disjunctions and conjunctions:
‖A ∨ B‖(M,v) :=‖A‖(M,v) ∪ ‖B‖(M,v),
‖A ∧ B‖(M,v) :=‖A‖(M,v) ∩ ‖B‖(M,v).
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3. For formulas prefixed by a modal operator:
‖〈a〉B‖(M,v) :={x ∈ |M| : (∃y)((x, y) ∈ M(a) and y ∈ ‖B‖(M,v))},
‖[a]B‖(M,v) :={x ∈ |M| : (∀y)((x, y) ∈ M(a) ⇒ y ∈ ‖B‖(M,v))}.
4. For fixed point formulas: Given a formula A[U ] where U does not occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U , we first
introduce the monotone operator
 : Pow(|M|) → Pow(|M|), (S) := ‖A[U ]‖(M,v[U :S]).
Based on this , we now set
‖(μX)A[X]‖(M,v) := I and ‖(νX)A[X]‖(M,v) := J.
With this definition in mind, we can easily introduce the notions of μ-validity and μ-satisfiability:
(μ-val) A formula A of Lμ is said to be μ-valid if |M| ⊂ ‖A‖(M,v) for all Kripke structures M and all valuations v in
M; in this case we write μ |= A.
(μ-sat) A formula A of Lμ is said to be μ-satisfiable if there exists a Kripke structure M and a valuation v in M so
that ‖A‖(M,v) /= ∅.
Following Kozen’s paper [13], we now recall a Hilbert-style formalization K(μ) of the propositional modal μ-calculus.
The multi-modal version of the modal logic K is simply extended by closure axioms and induction rules for the least
fixed point formulas (μX)A[X].
I. Logical axioms of K(μ). For all propositional tautologies A of Lμ, all Lμ formulas B and C and all labels a:
A, (TAUT)
[a]B ∧ [a](B → C) → [a]C. (K)
II. Logical rules of K(μ). For all Lμ formulas A and B and all labels a:
A A → B
B
, (MP)
A
[a]A . (NEC)
III. Closure axioms of K(μ). For all Lμ formulas A[U ] so that the free variable U does not occur in A and A[U ]
is positive in U :
A[(μX)A[X]] → (μX)A[X]. (μ-CLO)
IV. Induction rules of K(μ). For all Lμ formulas A[U ] so that U does not occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U
and all Lμ formulas B:
A[B] → B
(μX)A[X] → B . (μ-IND)
Provability of a formula A in the Hilbert system K(μ) is defined as usual and written as
K(μ)  A.
It is easily checked that for greatest fixed point formulas (νX)A[X] the duals of (μ-AX) and (μ-IND) can be derived
in K(μ). The proof of the following lemma is left to the reader.
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Lemma 8. For all Lμ formulas A[U ] where U does not occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U , and for all Lμ formulas
B we have:
1. K(μ)  (νX)A[X] → A[(νX)A[X]].
2. K(μ)  B → A[B] ⇒ K(μ)  B → (νX)A[X].
4. The infinitary μ-calculi K+ω (μ) and Kω(μ)
In this section we introduce two cut-free μ-calculi, the system K+ω (μ) and the system Kω(μ). Both introduce
formulas (νX)A[X] by a kind of ω-rule and therefore are infinitary deduction systems. We will later show that both
are sound and complete.
K+ω (μ) is an auxiliary system, needed for some technical reasons, which is formulated in the extension L+μ of Lμ.
The language L+μ is obtained from Lμ by adding syntactic constructs (νnX)A[X] for all natural numbers n greater than
0 to represent the finite approximations of (νX)A[X]. More precisely: the definition of the formulas of L+μ corresponds
to Definition 4 with one additional clause:
6. If A[U ] is a formula of L+μ which does not contain occurrences of ∼U , if the free variable U and the bound
variable X do not occur in A and if n is a natural number greater than 0, then (νnX)A[X] is a formula of L+μ .
Furthermore, for any L+μ formula A let A− denote the Lμ formula which is obtained from A by first replacing all
subexpressions of the form (νnX)A[X] by (νX)A[X] and afterwards all free variables by 
.
For measuring the complexities of L+μ formulas and in connection with the truth lemma of Section 5 it turns out
to be convenient to work with finite sequences of ordinals. If α1, . . . , αn are ordinals, we write 〈α1, . . . , αn〉 for the
sequence σ whose length lh(σ ) is n and whose ith component (σ )i is the ordinal αi ; i.e.
σ = 〈α1, . . . , αn〉 ⇒ lh(σ ) = n and (σ )i = αi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The empty sequence is written as 〈〉, and lh(〈〉) = 0. In the following we will often denote finite sequences of ordinals
by the boldface Greek letters σ and τ (possibly with subscripts).
Let <lex be the strict lexicographical ordering of finite sequences of ordinals and ≤lex its reflexive closure. Recall
that <lex is a well-ordering on any set of sequences of bounded lengths, though not a well-ordering in general. We also
need the component-wise ordering  of finite sequences of ordinals, given by
σ  τ :⇔ lh(σ ) ≤ lh(τ ) and (σ )i ≤ (τ )i for 1 ≤ i ≤ lh(σ ).
Clearly, the relation  is transitive. The concatenation ∗ of finite sequences of ordinals is as usual, and therefore we
have
σ ∗ τ = 〈α1, . . . , αm, β1, . . . , βn〉
whenever σ = 〈α1, . . . , αm〉 and τ = 〈β1, . . . , βn〉. Ultimately, we introduce on the finite sequences of ordinals a
specific maximum operation unionsq by setting: (i) σ unionsq 〈〉 := 〈〉 unionsq σ := σ ; (ii) if σ = 〈α1, . . . , αm〉 and τ = 〈β1, . . . , βn〉,
then
σ unionsq τ :=
{〈max(α1, β1), . . . , max(αm, βm), βm+1, . . . , βn〉 if m ≤ n,
〈max(α1, β1), . . . , max(αn, βn), αn+1, . . . , αm〉 if n < m.
Now we are ready to turn to the ranks and lengths of all L+μ formulas. As the following definition shows, the rank of
every L+μ formula A will be a finite sequence of ordinals less than or equal to ω, and the length of A simply is the
length of this sequence, hence a natural number.
Definition 9. The rank rk(A) of an L+μ formula A is inductively defined as follows:
1. If A is an atomic proposition, the negation of an atomic proposition, a free variable, the negation of a free variable
or a propositional constant, then rk(A) := 〈0〉.
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2. If A is a formula (B ∨ C) or a formula (B ∧ C), then
rk(A) := (rk(B) unionsq rk(C)) ∗ 〈0〉.
3. If A is a formula 〈a〉B or a formula [a]B, then
rk(A) := rk(B) ∗ 〈0〉.
4. If A is a formula (μX)A[X], then
rk(A) := rk(A[
]) ∗ 〈0〉.
5. If A is a formula (νX)A[X], then
rk(A) := rk(A[
]) ∗ 〈ω〉.
6. If A is a formula (νnX)A[X] for some natural number n greater than 0, then
rk(A) := rk(A[
]) ∗ 〈n〉.
The length lh(A) of an L+μ formula A is the length of the finite sequence rk(A), i.e. lh(A) := lh(rk(A)).
The following two lemmas summarize some elementary properties of the rank and length functions. Their proofs are
straightforward and will be omitted.
Lemma 10. For all L+μ formulas A we have
rk(A)  rk(A−) and lh(A) = lh(A−).
Lemma 11. For all L+μ formulas A, B and A[
], all labels a, all free variables U and all natural numbers n greater
than 0 we have:
1. rk(A), rk(B) <lex rk(A ∨ B) = rk(A ∧ B).
2. lh(A), lh(B) < lh(A ∨ B) = lh(A ∧ B).
3. rk(B) <lex rk(〈a〉B) = rk([a]B).
4. lh(B) < lh(〈a〉B) = lh([a]B).
5. rk(A[U ]) = rk(A[⊥]) = rk(A[
]).
6. lh(A[U ]) = lh(A[⊥]) = lh(A[
]).
7. rk(A[U ]) <lex rk((μX)A[X]), rk((νX)A[X]), rk((νnX)A[X]).
8. lh(A[U ]) < lh((νX)A[X]) = lh((νnX)A[X]).
The following lemma is more interesting and useful for establishing some connections between the ranks of formulas
of the form (νX)A[X], (νn+1X)A[X] and A[(νnX)A[X]]; see Theorem 13 below.
Lemma 12. Suppose that A[U ] is an L+μ formula positive in U with the free variable U occurring in A[U ] but not
in A and suppose that B is an L+μ formula satisfying rk(A[U ]) rk(B). Then there exists a finite (possibly empty)
sequence of ordinals σ so that
rk(A[B]) = rk(B) ∗ σ .
Proof. We show this lemma by induction on lh(A[U ]) and distinguish the following cases:
1. lh(A[U ]) = 1. Then A[U ] has to be the free variable U , and the assertion is trivially satisfied.
2. A[U ] is a formula (A1[U ] ∨ A2[U ]). Then we have
rk(A1[U ]), rk(A2[U ])  rk(A[U ])  rk(B). (1)
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If A1[U ] and A2[U ] contain the free variable U , we can apply the induction hypothesis to both formulas and obtain
rk(A1[B]) = rk(B) ∗ σ 1 and rk(A2[B]) = rk(B) ∗ σ 2 (2)
for suitable σ 1 and σ 2. Clearly, this implies
rk(A[B]) = ((rk(B) ∗ σ 1) unionsq (rk(B) ∗ σ 2)) ∗ 〈0〉, (3)
and we have our assertion for σ being the sequence (σ 1 unionsq σ 2) ∗ 〈0〉.
If only one of A1[U ] and A2[U ] – say A1[U ] – contains U , the induction hypothesis yields
rk(A1[B]) = rk(B) ∗ σ 1 (4)
for a suitable σ 1. But now we also know that A2[B] is the formula A2[U ] and deduce from (1) that
rk(A2[B])  rk(B). (5)
From (4) and (5) we conclude, for σ now being the sequence σ 1 ∗ 〈0〉,
rk(A[B]) = ((rk(B) ∗ σ 1) unionsq rk(A2[B])) ∗ 〈0〉 = rk(B) ∗ σ . (6)
3. A[U ] is a formula (A1[U ] ∧ A2[U ]). Then we proceed as in the previous case.
4. A[U ] is a formula of a form not covered so far. Then the assertion immediately follows from the induction
hypothesis. 
Theorem 13. For all L+μ formulas (νX)A[X] and all natural numbers n greater than 0 we have:
1. rk(A[
]) <lex rk((ν1X)A[X]).
2. rk(A[(νnX)A[X]]) <lex rk((νn+1X)A[X]).
3. rk((νnX)A[X]) <lex rk((νX)A[X]).
Proof. The first and the third assertion are immediate consequences of Definition 9. In order to prove the second
assertion, pick a free variable U which does not occur in A.
If this U does not even occur in A[U ], then A[(νnX)A[X]] is identical to the formula A[
], hence
rk(A[(νnX)A[X]]) <lex rk(A[
]) ∗ 〈n + 1〉 = rk((νn+1X)A[X]).
It remains to establish the second assertion for the case that U occurs in A[U ]. In view of Lemma 11 we know that
rk(A[U ]) rk((νnX)A[X]). Hence the previous lemma and Definition 9 yield, for some σ ,
rk(A[(νnX)A[X]]) = rk((νnX)A[X]) ∗ σ = (rk(A[
]) ∗ 〈n〉) ∗ σ .
Together with rk((νn+1X)A[X])=rk(A[
])∗〈n+1〉 this immediately gives rk(A[(νnX)A[X]]) <lex rk((νn+1X)A[X]),
completing the proof of our theorem. 
The infinitary calculus K+ω (μ) is formulated as a Tait-style system which derives finite sets ,,	,
, . . . (possibly
with subscripts) of L+μ formulas rather than individual L+μ formulas. These finite sets of L+μ formulas are interpreted
disjunctively, and in general we write ,A for  ∪ {A}; similarly for expressions of forms like ,,A,B. In addition,
if  is the set {A1, . . . , Am} of L+μ formulas and a some label, then 〈a〉 stands for the set {〈a〉A1, . . . , 〈a〉Am}.
K+ω (μ) contains the standard axioms and logical rules of the multi-modal version of the logic K, the Tait-style
analogues of the μ-closure-axioms plus rules for introducing (νnX)A[X] and (νX)A[X].
I. Axioms of K+ω (μ). For all finite sets  of L+μ formulas, all atomic propositions P and all free variables U :
, 
, (Ax1)
, P, ∼P, (Ax2)
, U, ∼U. (Ax3)
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II. Logical rules of K+ω (μ). For all finite sets , of L+μ formulas, all labels a and all L+μ formulas A,B:
, A, B
, A ∨ B , (∨)
, A , B
, A ∧ B , (∧)
, A
〈a〉, [a]A,  . (K)
III. μ-rules of K+ω (μ). For all finite sets  of L+μ formulas and all L+μ formulas A[U ] where U does not occur in
A and A[U ] is positive in U :
, A[(μX)A[X]]
, (μX)A[X] . (μ)
IV. ν-rules of K+ω (μ). For all finite sets  of L+μ formulas and all L+μ formulas A[U ] where U does not occur in A
and A[U ] is positive in U :
, A[
]
, (ν1X)A[X] , (ν.1)
, A[(νnX)A[X]]
, (νn+1X)A[X] , (ν.n+1)
. . . , (νnX)A[X] . . . (for all 0 < n < ω)
, (νX)A[X] . (ν.ω)
Provability of  in K+ω (μ) is defined as usual and denoted by K+ω (μ)  . On account of the rule (ν.ω) there are
derivations in K+ω (μ) which are infinitely branching trees of infinite depths.
It is obvious from the formulation of these axioms and rules that K+ω (μ) satisfies weakening in the usual sense; that
is, if  is provable in K+ω (μ) and if  is a subset of , then  is also provable in K+ω (μ).
It is not at all obvious that K+ω (μ) is sound and complete. The completeness of K+ω (μ) will be established in the
next section by means of specific saturated sets.
Concerning soundness, problems might occur in connection with the infinitary rule (ν.ω). Its premises are exactly
the finite stages of the greatest fixed point represented by (νX)A[X]. However, in arbitrary Kripke structures a greatest
fixed point may very well be composed of transfinite stages. Therefore, in the context of such models, the rule (ν.ω)
does not provide sufficiently many premises to be directly seen to be correct.
Nevertheless, K+ω (μ) will turn out to be sound. But rather than showing its soundness directly, we will in Section 6
prove the soundness of a finite system K<ω(μ) which contains K+ω (μ).
There is also a syntactic simplification Kω(μ) of K+ω (μ) which stays within the language Lμ and avoids the specific
constructs (νnX)A[X] which are not part of Lμ. In Lμ the finite approximations of greatest fixed points (νX)A[X] are
represented by the Lμ formulas (νX)nA[X] which are inductively defined, for each natural number n > 0, as follows:
(νX)1A[X] := A[
] and (νX)n+1A[X] := A[(νX)nA[X]].
Recursively replacing all expressions (νnX)A[X] of L+μ by these Lμ formulas (νX)nA[X] provides a translation of
L+μ into Lμ.
Definition 14. The translation A∗ of an L+μ formula A is inductively defined as follows:
1. If A is an atomic proposition, the negation of an atomic proposition, a free variable, the negation of a free variable
or a propositional constant, then A∗ := A.
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2. If A is a formula (B ∨ C), then A∗ := (B∗ ∨ C∗); if A is a formula (B ∧ C), then A∗ := (B∗ ∧ C∗).
3. If A is a formula 〈a〉B, then A∗ := 〈a〉B∗; if A is a formula [a]B, then A∗ := [a]B∗.
4. If A is a formula (μX)A[X], then A∗ := (μX)A∗[X]; if A is a formula (νX)A[X], then A∗ := (νX)A∗[X].
5. If A is a formula (νnX)A[X] for some natural number n greater than 0, then A∗ := (νX)nA∗[X].
This definition is extended to finite sets of L+μ formulas in the obvious way: for  = {A1, . . . , An} we set ∗ :=
{A∗1, . . . , A∗n}.
Lemma 15. If A is a formula of L+μ , then A∗ is a formula of Lμ. Moreover, if A is a formula of Lμ, then A∗ and A
are identical.
The proof of this lemma is trivial. It is interesting to note that the L+μ formula A and the Lμ formula A have the same
“meaning”; their ranks, on the other hand, can be completely different.
As K+ω (μ), the calculus Kω(μ) is formulated in a Tait-style manner, now deriving finite sets of Lμ formulas. The
axioms, the logical rules and the μ-rules of Kω(μ) correspond exactly to the axioms, logical rules and μ-rules of
K+ω (μ); because of our syntactic simplification the rules (ν.1) and (ν.n+1) are not needed in Kω(μ), and the rule (ν.ω)
is converted to the rule (ν) which works with the Lμ formulas (νX)nA[X] instead of the L+μ formulas (νnX)A[X].
I. Axioms of Kω(μ). For all finite sets  of Lμ formulas, all atomic propositions P and all free variables U :
, 
, (Ax1)
, P, ∼P, (Ax2)
, U, ∼U. (Ax3)
II. Logical rules of Kω(μ). For all finite sets , of Lμ formulas, all labels a and all Lμ formulas A,B:
, A, B
, A ∨ B , (∨)
, A , B
, A ∧ B , (∧)
, A
〈a〉, [a]A,  . (K)
III. μ-rules of Kω(μ). For all finite sets  of Lμ formulas and all Lμ formulas A[U ] where U does not occur in
A and A[U ] is positive in U :
, A[(μX)A[X]]
, (μX)A[X] . (μ)
IV. ν-rules of Kω(μ). For all finite sets  of Lμ formulas and all Lμ formulas A[U ] where U does not occur in A
and A[U ] is positive in U :
. . . , (νX)nA[X] . . . (for all 0 < n < ω)
, (νX)A[X] . (ν)
In analogy to before, we write Kω(μ)   to express that the finite set  of Lμ formulas is provable in Kω(μ).
We are free to regard Kω(μ) as the Lμ counterpart of the L+μ calculus K+ω (μ). In particular, we have the following
embedding result.
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Theorem 16. For all finite sets  of L+μ formulas we have
K+ω (μ)   ⇒ Kω(μ)  ∗.
In particular, if  is a finite set of Lμ formulas, then
K+ω (μ)   ⇒ Kω(μ)  .
Proof. To show the first assertion, we proceed by induction on the proof of  in K+ω (μ). Just observe that all
applications of the rules (ν.1) and (ν.n+1) trivialize in view of the *-translation and that (ν.ω) goes over into (ν). The
second assertion is a direct consequence of the first and Lemma 15. 
5. Saturated sets
We will show the completeness of the calculus K+ω (μ) by extending the technique of saturated sets, cf. e.g. Alberucci
and Jäger [1]. Before we go on, we need some additional notation.
Definition 17. The Fischer–Ladner closure FL(D) of an Lμ sentence D is the set of Lμ formulas which is inductively
generated as follows:
1. D belongs to FL(D).
2. If (A ∨ B) belongs to FL(D), then A and B belong to FL(D).
3. If (A ∧ B) belongs to FL(D), then A and B belong to FL(D).
4. If 〈a〉B belongs to FL(D), then B belongs to FL(D).
5. If [a]B belongs to FL(D), then B belongs to FL(D).
6. If (μX)A[X] belongs to FL(D), then A[⊥] and A[(μX)A[X]] belong to FL(D).
7. If (νX)A[X] belongs to FL(D), then A[
] and A[(νX)A[X]] belong to FL(D).
The Fischer–Ladner closure is a standard concept in the realm of fixed-point and dynamic logics, going back to Fischer
and Ladner [8]. An uncomplicated adaptation of the proof in this article yields the finiteness of FL(D).
Lemma 18. The cardinality of the Fischer–Ladner closure FL(D) of an Lμ formula D is linear in the length lh(D)
of D; in particular, FL(D) is finite.
Unfortunately, the Fischer–Ladner closure does not provide a sufficiently rich framework for the model construction
we plan to carry through. This will be provided by the notion of strong closure SC(D) of an Lμ formula D which is
defined now.
Definition 19. The strong closure SC(D) of anLμ sentence D is the set ofL+μ formulas which is inductively generated
as follows:
1. D belongs to SC(D).
2. If (A ∨ B) belongs to SC(D), then A and B belong to SC(D).
3. If (A ∧ B) belongs to SC(D), then A and B belong to SC(D).
4. If 〈a〉B belongs to SC(D), then B belongs to SC(D).
5. If [a]B belongs to SC(D), then B belongs to SC(D).
6. If (μX)A[X] belongs to SC(D), then A[⊥] and A[(μX)A[X]] belong to SC(D).
7. If (νX)A[X] belongs to SC(D), then A[
] and, for every natural number n greater than 0, (νnX)A[X] belong
to SC(D).
8. If (ν1X)A[X] belongs to SC(D), then A[
] belongs to SC(D).
9. If n is a natural number greater than 0 and (νn+1X)A[X] belongs to SC(D), then A[(νnX)A[X]] belongs to
SC(D).
10. If A[
] belongs to SC(D), then, for every free variable U , A[U ] belongs to SC(D).
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The sets SC(D) are infinite in general. Nevertheless we have a decisive relationship between the sets FL(D) and
SC(D) which is described in the following lemma and easily proved by induction on the generation of the set SC(D).
Lemma 20. Let D be some Lμ sentence. Then for all L+μ formulas A we have
A ∈ SC(D) ⇒ A− ∈ FL(D).
It is a direct consequence of Lemma 10 that the sets {lh(A) : A ∈ SC(D)} and {lh(A−) : A ∈ SC(D)} are identical.
The previous lemma and Lemma 18, stating the finiteness of the Fischer-Ladner closure FL(D), thus imply a further
finiteness result.
Lemma 21. Let D be some Lμ sentence. Then {lh(A) : A ∈ SC(D)} is a finite set of natural numbers.
Therefore the ranks of all formulas in SC(D) are finite sequences of ordinals whose lengths are bounded by some
natural number and, consequently, according to a standard result, well-ordered by their lexicographical ordering.
Lemma 22. If D is a sentence of Lμ, then the restriction of the lexicographical ordering <lex to the set
{rk(A) : A ∈ SC(D)} is a well-ordering.
In other words, definitions and proofs by induction on the ranks of the formulas from SC(D) are legitimate.
This justifies, for example, to canonically extend the semantics of Lμ to L+μ . Given a sentence D of Lμ, a Kripke
structure M and a valuation v in M, we simply add, for n ≥ 1 and formulas (ν1X)A[X] and (νn+1X)A[X] from
SC(D), the following clauses:
‖(ν1X)A[X]‖(M,v) := ‖A[
]‖(M,v),
‖(νn+1X)A[X]‖(M,v) := ‖A[(νnX)A[X]]‖(M,v).
We now come to the central concept of this section. The starting point is an arbitrary formula D of Lμ. Then we
are interested in all finite subsets of SC(D) which are not derivable in K+ω (μ) and have the closure properties (S.2)
and (S.3) below. These so-called D-saturated sets will form the elements of the Kripke structure SD , cf. Definition 25,
playing the crucial part in our proof of the completeness of K+ω (μ).
Definition 23. Let D be some Lμ sentence. A finite subset  of SC(D) is called D-saturated (with respect to K+ω (μ))
if the following conditions are satisfied:
(S.1) K+ω (μ)  .
(S.2) For all L+μ formulas A and B we have
A ∨ B ∈  ⇒ A ∈  and B ∈ ,
A ∧ B ∈  ⇒ A ∈  or B ∈ .
(S.3) For all L+μ formulas A[U ] where U does not occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U and all natural numbers n
greater than 0 we have
(μX)A[X] ∈  ⇒ A[(μX)A[X]] ∈ ,
(νX)A[X] ∈  ⇒ (νiX)A[X] ∈  for some 0 < i < ω,
(νn+1X)A[X] ∈  ⇒ A[(νnX)A[X]] ∈ ,
(ν1X)A[X] ∈  ⇒ A[
] ∈ .
Suppose that  is a finite subset of SC(D), not provable in K+ω (μ) and not D-saturated. Then one of the conditions
(S.2), (S.3) has to be violated for. By systematically correcting such deficiencies, we can extend this to aD-saturated
.
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Lemma 24. Let D be some Lμ sentence. For every finite subset  of SC(D) which is not provable in K+ω (μ) there
exists a finite subset  of SC(D) which is D-saturated and contains .
Proof. We begin by fixing an arbitrary enumeration F0, F1, . . . of all formulas in SC(D) and call the least i such that
the formula A from SC(D) is identical to Fi the index of A. Besides that, we introduce the following auxiliary notion:
Let N be a subset of SC(D). Then the N -rank rk(N,A) of a formula A from SC(D) is set to be 〈0〉 provided that
A ∈ N ,
A ∈ N ⇒ rk(N,A) = 〈0〉,
and inductively defined according to Definition 9 for all A not from N . In analogy to the definition of lh(A) we write
lh(N,A) for lh(rk(N,A)). Clearly, for all subsets N,N1, N2 of SC(D) and all elements A of SC(D), these modified
ranks have the following properties:
lh(N,A) ≤ lh(A), (1)
A ∈ N ⇒ rk(N,B[A]) = rk(N,B[
]), (2)
N1 ⊂ N2 ⇒ rk(N2, A) ≤lex rk(N1, A). (3)
From (1) and Lemma 21 we obtain a strengthening of Lemma 22: even the restriction of <lex to the set
{rk(N,A) : N ⊂ SC(D) and A ∈ SC(D)} is a well-ordering. Given a subset N of SC(D) and a formula A from
SC(D), it therefore makes sense to write ot(N,A) for the order type of rk(N,A) with respect to this well-ordering.
Depending on the given finite subset of SC(D)which, by assumption, is not provable in K+ω (μ)we now inductively
define, for each natural number n, subsets n of SC(D) and auxiliary sets Mn; we convince ourselves during this
process that these n are not provable in K+ω (μ):
1. 0 :=  and M0 := ∅.
2. If n is D-saturated, then n+1 := n and Mn+1 := Mn.
3. If n is not D-saturated, we choose the formula A with least index that violates either of the conditions in (S.2)
and (S.3); afterwards n+1 and Mn+1 are determined by distinguishing between the possible forms of A.
3.1. A is a formula (B ∨ C). Then we set
n+1 := n ∪ {B,C} and Mn+1 := Mn.
3.2. A is a formula (B ∧ C). Since n is not provable in K+ω (μ) we know that either
K+ω (μ)n, B or K+ω (μ)n, C.
Then we set
n+1 :=
{
n ∪ {B} if K+ω (μ)n, B
n ∪ {C} otherwise
and Mn+1 := Mn.
3.3. A is a formula (μX)B[X]. Then we set
n+1 := n ∪ {B[(μX)B[X]]} and Mn+1 := Mn ∪ {(μX)B[X]}.
3.4. A is a formula (νX)B[X]. Since n is not provable in K+ω (μ) we know that
K+ω (μ)n, (νiX)B[X]
for some natural number i greater than 0. We choose the least such i and set
n+1 := n ∪ {(νiX)B[X]} and Mn+1 := Mn.
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3.5. A is a formula (νi+1X)B[X] for some natural number i greater than 0. Then we set
n+1 := n ∪ {B[(νiX)B[X]]} and Mn+1 := Mn.
3.6. A is a formula (ν1X)B[X]. Then we set
n+1 := n ∪ {B[
]} and Mn+1 := Mn.
What we have done so far guarantees that, for all natural numbers n,
K+ω (μ)n, (4)
 ⊂ n ⊂ n+1 and Mn ⊂ Mn+1, (5)
(μX)B[X] ∈ Mn ⇒ B[(μX)B[X]] ∈ n. (6)
Next we turn to two properties of this sequence (0,M0), (1,M1), . . . which will be crucial in proving that n will
be D-saturated for some natural number n.
(i) If the formula (μX)B[X] belongs to Mn+1 but not to Mn, then
ot(Mn+1,B[(μX)B[X]]) < ot(Mn, (μX)B[X]).
(ii) If (μX)B[X] is the formula violating one of the conditions in (S.2) and (S.3) which is picked at step n + 1 of the
construction described above, then
ot(Mn+1,B[(μX)B[X]]) < ot(Mn, (μX)B[X]).
To prove (i), assume that (μX)B[X] is an element of Mn+1 \ Mn. By (2) and (3) this implies
rk(Mn+1,B[(μX)B[X]]) = rk(Mn+1,B[
]) ≤lex rk(Mn,B[
]). (7)
But we also have, since (μX)B[X] /∈ Mn,
rk(Mn,B[
]) <lex rk(Mn,B[
]) ∗ 〈0〉 = rk(Mn, (μX)B[X]). (8)
Assertions (7) and (8) imply rk(Mn+1,B[(μX)B[X]]) <lex rk(Mn, (μX)B[X]), hence (i) is proved. Because of (6),
(ii) is an immediate consequence of (i).
In a next step we assign to all finite subsets N and 	 of SC(D), with 	 not being provable in K+ω (μ), their deficiency
numbers dn(N,	):
(D.1) If 	 is D-saturated, then dn(N,	) := 0.
(D.2) Otherwise, fix some enumeration A1, A2, . . . , Am (without repetitions) of all elements of 	 violating one of
the conditions in (S.2) and (S.3) and set
dn(N,	) := ωot(N,A1) # ωot(N,A2) # · · · # ωot(N,Am),
where # stands for the natural sum of ordinals as introduced, for example, in Schütte [20].
Coming to the end of this proof, we observe that (ii) together with the definition of the relativized rank function and
(3) yields for all natural numbers n that
n is not D-saturated ⇒ dn(Mn+1, n+1) < dn(Mn, n). (9)
Since there are no infinite decreasing sequences of ordinals, one of the sets n has to be D-saturated and is thus a
possible candidate for the choice of . 
Our interest is in Kripke structures SD , depending on Lμ formulas D, whose universes are the D-saturated subsets of
SC(D). We will eventually show that an Lμ formula D is provable in K+ω (μ) if D is valid in SD .
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Definition 25. Let D be some Lμ sentence. Then SD is the Kripke structure which is defined by the following three
conditions:
(SD .1) The universe |SD| of SD consists exactly of the D-saturated sets.
(SD .2) For any label a, the binary relation SD(a) on |SD| is given by
(,) ∈ SD(a) :⇐⇒ (,) ∈ |SD|2 and {B : 〈a〉B ∈  } ⊂ .
(SD .3) For any atomic proposition P , the subset SD(P ) of |SD| is given by
SD(P ) := { ∈ |SD| : P /∈  }.
Although we are finally interested in interpreting Lμ and L+μ formulas in Kripke structures SD , technical reasons
(see the proof of Lemma 33 below) compel us to work with intermediate structures in which formulas of the form
(μX)A[X] are interpreted as stages of the least fixed points of the inductive definitions associated to (the interpretation
of) A. The depth of the nestings of the fixed point operator μ has to be taken into account as well.
Definition 26. The μ-height hμ(A) of an L+μ formula A is inductively defined as follows:
1. If A is an atomic proposition, the negation of an atomic proposition, a free variable, the negation of a free variable
or a propositional constant, then hμ(A) := 0.
2. If A is a formula (B ∨ C) or a formula (B ∧ C), then
hμ(A) := max(hμ(B), hμ(C)).
3. If A is a formula 〈a〉B or a formula [a]B, then
hμ(A) := hμ(B).
4. If A is a formula (μX)A[X], then
hμ(A) := hμ(A[
]) + 1.
5. If A is a is a formula (νX)A[X] or (νnX)A[X] for some natural number n greater than 0, then
hμ(A) := hμ(A[
]).
From this definition we immediately obtain the first assertion of the following lemma, and, together with Lemma 21,
the second part.
Lemma 27
1. For all L+μ formulas A we have hμ(A) = hμ(A−) and hμ(A) < lh(A).
2. If D is an Lμ formula, then {hμ(A) : A ∈ SC(D)} is a finite set of natural numbers.
These observations justify assigning to each Lμ formula D a specific natural number, the μ-bound of D, majorizing
the μ-heights of the formulas in SC(D).
Definition 28. The μ-bound bμ(D) of an Lμ sentence D is the least natural number n so that hμ(A) ≤ n for all
formulas A from SC(D).
The μ-heights and finite sequences of ordinals play an important role in the context of so-called signed truth sets.
This concept has been introduced in Streett and Emerson [23] and is adjusted here to our needs.
Definition 29. Let D be some Lμ sentence whose μ-bound bμ(D) is the natural number n, and consider a sequence
of ordinals σ = 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉. Then, for any formula A from the set SC(D) and any valuation v in SD , the signed
truth set ‖A‖σ(D,v) is defined by induction on rk(A) as follows:
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1. For atomic propositions, free variables and propositional constants:
‖P ‖σ(D,v) := SD(P ), ‖∼P ‖σ(D,v) := |SD| \ SD(P ),
‖U‖σ(D,v) := v(U), ‖∼U‖σ(D,v) := |SD| \ v(U),
‖
‖σ(D,v) := |SD|, ‖⊥‖σ(D,v) := ∅.
2. For disjunctions and conjunctions:
‖A ∨ B‖σ(D,v) :=‖A‖σ(D,v) ∪ ‖B‖σ(D,v),
‖A ∧ B‖σ(D,v) :=‖A‖σ(D,v) ∩ ‖B‖σ(D,v).
3. For formulas prefixed by a modal operator:
‖〈a〉B‖σ(D,v) :={ ∈ |SD| : (∃)((,) ∈ SD(a) &  ∈ ‖B‖σ(D,v))},
‖[a]B‖σ(D,v) :={ ∈ |SD| : (∀)((,) ∈ SD(a) ⇒  ∈ ‖B‖σ(D,v))}.
4. For least fixed point formulas: Given a formula A[U ] where U does not occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U ,
we first introduce the monotone operator
 : Pow(|SD|) → Pow(|SD|), (S) := ‖A[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :S]).
Based on this , we now set, for m = hμ((μX)A[X]),
‖(μX)A[X]‖σ(D,v) := I<σm .
5. For greatest fixed point formulas: Given a formula A[U ] where U does not occur in A and A[U ] is positive in U
and k is a natural number greater than 0:
‖(ν1X)A[X]‖σ(D,v) := ‖A[
]‖σ(D,v),
‖(νk+1X)A[X]‖σ(D,v) := ‖A[(νkX)A[X]]‖σ(D,v),
‖(νX)A[X]‖σ(D,v) :=
⋂
i<ω
‖(νiX)A[X]‖σ(D,v).
In the special case of a finite sequence of ordinals consisting of identical components, a useful substitution property is
available. Its proof is by induction on rk(A[U ]).
Lemma 30. Let D be some Lμ sentence, B some L+μ formula and A[U ] an L+μ formula where U does not occur in
A and A[U ] is positive in U . Assume, in addition, that A[U ] and A[B] belong to SC(D). For all ordinals σ and
all sequences of ordinals σ = 〈σ, . . . , σ 〉 of length bμ(D), all valuations v in SD and all subsets S of |SD| we then
have
S = ‖B‖σ(D,v) ⇒ ‖A[B]‖σ(D,v) = ‖A[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :S]).
Signed truth sets ‖A‖σ(D,v) deviate in two fundamental aspects from the truth sets ‖A‖(SD,v): (i) subformulas (μX)B[X]
of A are not interpreted by the corresponding least fixed points but only by their approximations determined by the
hμ((μX)B[X])-th component of σ ; (ii) subformulas (νX)B[X] of A are interpreted as the intersection of the finite
approximations of the corresponding greatest fixed points, meaning that, in general, their interpretations are proper
supersets of the greatest fixed points. There is, however, an interesting relationship between signed truth sets and truth
sets.
Lemma 31. Let us assume that
(A.1) D is an Lμ sentence,
(A.2) κ is the least cardinal greater than the cardinality of |SD|,
(A.3) κ is the sequence of ordinals 〈κ, . . . , κ〉 of length bμ(D).
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Then for all formulas A from SC(D) and valuations v in SD we have
‖A‖(SD,v) ⊂ ‖A‖κ(D,v).
Proof. This proceeds by induction on rk(A), and we distinguish the following cases:
1. A is an atomic proposition, a free variable or a propositional constants. Then the assertion is obvious.
2. A is a disjunction or a conjunction, a formula prefixed by a modal operator or a formula (νnX)A[X] for some
natural number n greater than 0. Then the assertion follows directly from the induction hypothesis.
3. A is a formula (μX)A[X] or (νX)A[X]. Then we first pick a free variable U which does not occur in A and
consider the two monotone operators
 : Pow(|SD|) → Pow(|SD|), (S) := ‖A[U ]‖(SD,v[U :S]),
 : Pow(|SD|) → Pow(|SD|), (S) := ‖A[U ]‖κ(D,v[U :S]).
By induction hypothesis we have (S) ⊂ (S) for all S ⊂ SC(D); therefore I ⊂ I and J ⊂ J . Consequently,
‖(μX)A[X]‖(SD,v) = I ⊂ I = I<κ = ‖(μX)A[X]‖κ(D,v), (1)
‖(νX)A[X]‖(SD,v) = J ⊂ J ⊂ J<ω = ‖(νX)A[X]‖κ(D,v) (2)
are easily obtained by recalling the definitions of the truth sets and signed truth sets of these fixed point formulas; for
the last equality in (2) we also have to make use of the previous lemma. This completes our proof. 
Considering a formula (μX)A[X] and its unfolding A[(μX)A[X]] we want to show that given a sequence of ordinals
σ there exists a lexicographically smaller sequence τ such that the signed truth set of (μX)A[X] under σ is a subset
of the signed truth set of A[(μX)A[X]] under τ . This property will be of crucial use to us when considering signed
denotations in an induction on sequences of ordinals of bounded length. For technical reasons we deal with a more
general version of this assertion.
Lemma 32. Let us assume that
(A.1) D is an Lμ sentence, A[U ] and B[U ] are formulas from SC(D) positive in U , and U occurs neither in A
nor in B,
(A.2) (μX)A[X] and B[(μX)A[X]] belong to SC(D),
(A.3) hμ((μX)A[X]) = m + 1 and hμ(B[U ]) ≤ m,
(A.4) κ is the least cardinal greater than the cardinality of |SD|,
(A.5) σ is a sequence of ordinals 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉 of length n = bμ(D),
(A.6) τ the sequence of ordinals 〈σ1, . . . , σm, α, κ, . . . , κ〉 of length n.
Then for every valuation v in SD and the associated monotone operator
 : Pow(|SD|) → Pow(|SD|), (S) := ‖A[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :S])
we have
‖B[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :I<α ]) ⊂ ‖B[(μX)A[X]]‖
τ
(D,v).
Proof. We prove this assertion by induction on rk(B[U ]). Given a valuation v in SD , we distinguish the following
cases:
1. U does not occur in B[U ]. Then, trivially,
‖B[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :I<α ]) = ‖B[U ]‖
σ
(D,v) and ‖B[U ]‖τ(D,v) = ‖B[(μX)A[X]]‖τ(D,v).
From hμ(B[U ]) ≤ m we further obtain ‖B[U ]‖σ(D,v) = ‖B[U ]‖τ(D,v), completing the discussion of this case.
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2. B[U ] is the formula U . In this case we first introduce the auxiliary monotone operator
 : Pow(|SD|) → Pow(|SD|), (S) := ‖A[U ]‖τ(D,v[U :S])
However, since hμ(A[U ]) ≤ m, we have (S) = (S) for all S ⊂ |SD|, and this implies
‖B[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :I<α ]) = I
<α
 = I<α = ‖(μX)A[X]‖τ(D,v) = ‖B[(μX)A[X]]‖τ(D,v).
3. B[U ] is a disjunction or a conjunction, a formula prefixed by a modal operator, a formula (νX)A[X] or a formula
(νnX)A[X] for some natural number n greater than 0. Then the assertion immediately follows from the induction
hypothesis.
4. B[U ] is a formula (μY )C[U, Y ] with U occurring in B[U ]. We select a free variable V different from U which
does not occur in C[(μX)A[X],
] and consider the monotone operators
 : Pow(|SD|) → Pow(|SD|), (S) := ‖C[U,V ]‖σ(D,v[U :I<α ][V :S]),
 : Pow(|SD|) → Pow(|SD|), (S) := ‖C[(μX)A[X], V ]‖τ(D,v[V :S]).
We claim that
I
<ξ
 ⊂ I<ξ for all ordinals ξ . (1)
This is proved by side induction on ξ . If 	 is an element of I<ξ , we have 	 ∈ (I<ζ ) for some ζ < ξ . Consequently,
the side induction hypothesis implies
	 ∈ (I<ζ ) = ‖C[U,V ]‖σ(D,v[U :I<α ][V :I<ζ ]).
By the choice of V we also know that the valuation v[U :I<α ][V :I<ζ ] is identical to the valuation v[V :I<ζ ][U :I<α ],
and so
	 ∈ ‖C[U,V ]‖σ
(D,v[V :I<ζ ][U :I<α ])
.
Since rk(C[U,V ]) < rk(B[U ]), it is possible to apply the main induction hypothesis and to infer that
	 ∈ ‖C[(μX)A[X], V ]‖τ
(D,v[V :I<ζ ])
= (I<ζ ).
Together with the trivial fact (I<ζ ) ⊂ I<ξ , this makes clear that claim (1) holds.
From assumption (A.3) we obtain hμ(B[U ]) = k for some k ≤ m, and it is then seen that
‖B[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :I<α ]) = I
<σk
 .
Combining this result with assertion (1) and the choice of κ , we may continue with
‖B[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :I<α ]) ⊂ I
<σk
 ⊂ I<κ . (2)
Recalling that U occurs in B[U ], the inequality m + 1 < hμ(B[(μX)A[X]]) becomes obvious, and therefore
‖B[(μX)A[X]]‖τ(D,v) = ‖(μY )C[(μX)A[X], Y ]‖τ(D,v) = I<κ . (3)
By (2) and (3) our assertion is also proved for this case. 
Lemma 33 (Truth lemma). Let D be some Lμ sentence and n its μ-bound bμ(D). Then for all sequences of ordinals σ
of lengths less than or equal to n, all sentences A from SC(D), all D-saturated subsets  of SC(D) and all valuations
v in SD we have
A ∈  ⇒  /∈ ‖A‖σ(D,v).
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Proof. We show this lemma by main induction on the sequences of ordinals of lengths less than or equal to n and side
induction on rk(A), and distinguish the following cases:
1. A is an atomic proposition, the negation of an atomic proposition or a propositional constant. Then the assertion
is easily verified.
2. A is a disjunction or a conjunction, a formula (νnX)A[X] for some natural number n greater than 0 or a formula
(νX)A[X]. Then the assertion follows directly from the side induction hypothesis; see Lemma 11 and Theorem 13.
3. A is a formula 〈a〉B. Then choose an arbitrary D-saturated  satisfying (,) ∈ SD(a). Therefore
{C : 〈a〉C ∈ } ⊂  and, since A is an element of  according to our assumption, this yields B ∈ . By the side
induction hypothesis we obtain  /∈ ‖B‖σ(D,v). This implies that  /∈ ‖A‖σ(D,v).
4. A is a formula [a]B. Since  is D-saturated, K+ω (μ) does not prove . By the (K) rule of K+ω (μ) we infer that
K+ω (μ)  {C : 〈a〉C ∈ }, B. (1)
But now we know, because of Lemma 24, that there exists a D-saturated  with the properties
{C : 〈a〉C ∈ } ⊂ , (2)
B ∈ . (3)
By (2) we have (,) ∈ SD(a), by (3) the side induction hypothesis implies  /∈ ‖B‖σ(D,v). And together this means
that  /∈ ‖A‖σ(D,v).
5. A is a formula (μX)A[X]. Since, by assumption, A is an element of the D-saturated , we know
A[(μX)A[X]] ∈ . (4)
We pick a free variable U which does not occur in A plus some valuation v in SD and consider the monotone operator
 : Pow(|SD|) → Pow(|SD|), (S) := ‖A[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :S]).
The μ-height of (μX)A[X] is a natural number m + 1 with hμ(A[U ]) ≤ m, and σ = 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉 for suitable ordinals
σ1, . . . , σn. According to Definition 29 we thus have
‖A‖σ(D,v) = ‖(μX)A[X]‖σ(D,v) = I<σm+1 . (5)
To establish our claim, regard the statement
 ∈ ‖A‖σ(D,v). (6)
In view of (5) there exists an ordinal α < σm+1 so that  ∈ (I<α ), i.e.
 ∈ ‖A[U ]‖σ(D,v[U :I<α )]). (7)
As above we choose κ to be the least cardinal greater than the cardinality of Pow(|SC(D)|) and set τ :=
〈σ1, . . . , σm, α, κ, . . . , κ〉. The previous lemma therefore furnishes proof of
 ∈ ‖A[(μX)A[X]]‖τ(D,v). (8)
However, we also know that τ <lex σ , and, as a consequence of (4) and the main induction hypothesis,
 /∈ ‖A[(μX)A[X]]‖τ(D,v). (9)
Lines (8) and (9) contradict each other, meaning that (6) is false. Hence  cannot be an element of ‖A‖σ(D,v), and our
proof is complete. 
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Theorem 34 (Truth theorem). Let D be some Lμ sentence and A a sentence from SC(D). Then for all D-saturated
subsets  of SC(D) and all valuations v in SD we have
A ∈  ⇒  /∈ ‖A‖(SD,v).
Proof. Again we take κ to be the least cardinal greater than the cardinality of |SD| and κ to be the sequence of ordinals
〈κ, . . . , κ〉 of length bμ(D). Given a sentence A from SC(D), a D-saturated subset of S(D) and a valuation v in S,
the truth lemma implies
 /∈ ‖A‖κ(D,v),
provided that A belongs to . But now it only remains to apply Lemma 31 in order to deduce  /∈ ‖A‖(SD,v). This
completes our argument. 
Theorem 35 (Completeness of K+ω (μ)). For all sentences A of Lμ we have
μ |= A ⇒ K+ω (μ)  A.
Proof. If A is not provable in K+ω (μ), then, by Lemma 24, there exists an A-saturated subset  of SC(A) which
contains A as an element. Now we apply the truth theorem and obtain  /∈ ‖A‖(SA,v), with v being any valuation in
SA. Consequently, A is not μ-valid. By contraposition we have the desired result. 
We close this section with the completeness result for the system Kω(μ). Fortunately, the work is already done: by
Theorem 16 the completeness of K+ω (μ) carries over to Kω(μ).
Corollary 36 (Completeness of Kω(μ)). For all sentences A of Lμ we have
μ |= A ⇒ Kω(μ)  A.
As mentioned above, Kω(μ) and K+ω (μ) are also sound with respect to the semantics introduced in Section 3. This
follows immediately from Theorem 41 in the next section which states the soundness of the finite variant K<ω(μ) of
Kω(μ).
6. The finitization K<ω(μ) of Kω(μ)
It is only the rule (ν) which is responsible for possibly infinite derivations in Kω(μ). All proofs will be completely
finite if we succeed in restricting the infinitely many premises of each application of (ν) to a finite subset. Fortunately,
this can be achieved by exploiting the small model property of the propositional modal μ-calculus. A similar approach
for PDL appears in Leivant [15].
Theorem 37 (Small model property). An exponential number-theoretic function f can be defined for which we have:
if A is a μ-satisfiable Lμ formula, then there exist a Kripke structure M and a valuation v in M so that the cardinality
of |M| is smaller than f (lh(A)) and ‖A‖(M,v) /= ∅.
Hence, if A is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in a finite Kripke structure whose number of worlds is exponentially
bounded in the length of A. For more details about this important result we refer to Bradfield and Stirling [5] and
Streett and Emerson [23].
Since the exact definition of the number-theoretic function f is not relevant for what we are doing now, we omit
further details concerning f . In the following we simply write  for the exponential function which assigns to any Lμ
formulas A the natural number (A) := f (lh(A)). Moreover, for a finite set  of Lμ formulas () is defined to be
the number (A1 ∨ . . . ∨ Am), where A1, . . . , Am is an enumeration of the elements of  without repetitions.
Utilizing  to provide a finite bound for the number of premises of a rule (ν), the finite versions of the ν-rules are
obtained. Observe that the number of premises of a finite ν-rule depends on the length of (the essential part of) its
conclusion; the set  is added in the conclusions just to incorporate weakening.
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V. Finite ν-rules. For all finite sets , of Lμ formulas and all Lμ formulas A[U ] where U does not occur in A
and A[U ] is positive in U :
. . . , (νX)nA[X] . . . (for all 0 < n < (, (νX)A[X]))
, (νX)A[X],  . (f-ν)
The system K<ω(μ) is Kω(μ) with the ν-rules (ν) replaced by their finite variants (f-ν), and the notion K<ω(μ)  
is introduced in analogy to Kω(μ)  .
Naturally, K<ω(μ) is a finite system. Besides that, every derivation in Kω(μ) collapses to a derivation in K<ω(μ).
The proof of this observation is by induction on the derivations in Kω(μ), and one only has to observe that each
application of a rule (ν) in Kω(μ) may be replaced by the appropriate rule (f-ν) in K<ω(μ).
Lemma 38. For all finite sets  of Lμ formulas we have
Kω(μ)   ⇒ K<ω(μ)  .
Of course, this means that the completeness of Kω(μ) transfers to K<ω(μ); just combine the previous lemma with
Corollary 36.
Corollary 39 (Completeness of K<ω(μ)). For all sentences A of Lμ we have
μ |= A ⇒ K<ω(μ)  A.
What remains is to show the soundness of K<ω(μ). To do so, we proceed by using the small model property,
along with the following lemma about the denotation of greatest fixed point on finite Kripke structures. Its proof
is standard and follows from more general results concerning approximations of least and greatest fixed points of
inductive definitions; see Theorem 3 and, for example, Moschovakis [17].
Lemma 40. Let M be a Kripke structure so that the cardinality of its universe |M| is less than or equal to the natural
number n. Then for all Lμ formulas (νX)A[X] and all valuations v in M we have
‖(νX)A[X]‖(M,v) = ‖(νX)nA[X]‖(M,v).
Summing up this lemma and the small model property of the μ-calculus, we can now easily establish the soundness
of K<ω(μ). Some additional notation is convenient: if  is the set {A1, . . . , Am} of Lμ formulas, then ∨ stands for
the Lμ formula (A1,∨ · · · ∨, Am).
Theorem 41 (Soundness of K<ω(μ)). For all finite sets  of Lμ formulas we have
K<ω(μ)   ⇒ μ |= ∨.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the derivation of , and we distinguish the following cases:
1.  is an axiom or the conclusion of a logical rule of K<ω(μ). Then our assertion is obvious or an immediate
consequence of the induction hypothesis.
2.  is the conclusion of a μ-rule of K<ω(μ). Then there exist a set  of Lμ formulas and an Lμ formula (μX)A[X]
so that  is the set , (μX)A[X] and this rule has the form
, A[(μX)A[X]]
, (μX)A[X] .
Now the induction hypothesis yields
μ |= ∨ ∨ A[(μX)A[X]]. (1)
But according to our semantics we also have
μ |= A[(μX)A[X]] → (μX)A[X], (2)
and therefore the desired μ-validity of ∨ is a trivial consequence of statements (1) and (2).
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3.  is the conclusion of a finite ν-rule of K<ω(μ). Then there exist a set  of Lμ formulas and an Lμ formula
(νX)A[X] so that  is the set , (νX)A[X] and this rule has the form
. . . , (νX)nA[X] . . . (for all 0 < n < (, (νX)A[X]))
, (νX)A[X], 	
for some auxiliary set 	. In this case the induction hypothesis yields
μ |= ∨ ∨ (νX)nA[X] (3)
for all natural numbers n such that 0 < n < (, (νX)A[X]). Now assume that the formula (∨ ∨ (νX)A[X]) is
not μ-valid. Then (¬∨ ∧ ¬(νX)A[X]) has to be μ-satisfiable, and we infer from the small model property, see
Theorem 37, that there exist a Kripke structure M and a valuation v in M so that the cardinality of |M|, we call it k, is
smaller than (, (νX)A[X]) and
‖¬∨ ∧ ¬(νX)A[X]‖(M,v) /= ∅. (4)
In view of Lemma 40 this inequality can be rewritten as
‖¬∨ ∧ ¬(νX)kA[X]‖(M,v) /= ∅, (5)
implying that the formula (∨ ∨ (νX)kA[X]) is not μ-valid. However, this is in contradiction to (3), and therefore
(∨ ∨ (νX)A[X]) has to be μ-valid. This completes the proof of our theorem. 
Considering this theorem in the context of Lemma 38 and Theorem 16, it provides the soundness of the two infinitary
calculi K+ω (μ) and Kω(μ).
Corollary 42 (Soundness of K+ω (μ) and Kω(μ)). For all finite sets  of Lμ formulas we have
K+ω (μ)   ⇒ Kω(μ)   ⇒ μ |= ∨.
What we have achieved are two very natural infinitary axiomatizations of the propositional modal μ-calculus which
are both sound and complete. They are cut-free, but because of their completeness, cut rules could be added without
changing their strength. In this sense we have semantic cut elimination for K+ω (μ) and Kω(μ).
K<ω(μ), on the other hand, is the finite collapse of Kω(μ) and is also cut-free, sound and complete as such. One
may argue how natural K<ω(μ) is as a deductive system. However, the important purpose of this system is to provide
an explicit proof that a cut-free adequate axiomatization of the propositional modal μ-calculus exists.
Corollary 43 (Summary). The systems K<ω(μ), Kω(μ) and K+ω (μ) provide cut-free, sound and complete axiomati-
zations of the propositional modal μ-calculus.
A natural research direction is to look for alternative cut-free, sound and complete axiomatizations of the propositional
modal μ-calculus. It would also be interesting to see whether there is a syntactic procedure for transforming proofs
in K<ω(μ) + (Cut) into proofs in K<ω(μ). As a preparatory step it might be reasonable to study the related question
first for Kω(μ) + (Cut) and Kω(μ).
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